Articles by Scott Opsal, CFA Chief Investment Officer

Extended bull markets are the primary attraction of equity investing and play an integral role in generating long-term returns.  However, investors must take heed when psychological excesses turn a garden variety bull market into mania-induced price chasing.  Instead of reaping the customary gains offered up by a typical bull, the risk and reward tradeoffs become exponentially larger when exuberance overpowers prudence.  Recognizing the difference between a bull market and a bubble is critical for building a respectable long-term track record.   There are subjective attributes common to most manic equity markets, and although these signposts are not mechanical or quantitative, taken together they tell a coherent story.

This essay takes a broader view of Manias, Bubbles, Panics, and Crashes by expanding on these terms, considering the benefits of studying stock market bubbles, and looking for commonalities that mark each phase of a euphoric price cycle.  The most practical reason to study bubbles and crashes is the simple fact that they appear far more often than one might expect. Rational investors may be inclined to dismiss the periodic appearance of bubble conditions as just so much noise and frivolity, leaving us to focus on real world issues like the economy, profits, and expected returns. However, we believe the impact of manias and crashes on investment performance over an entire career is significant to the point of being decisive, and that is the most compelling reason to study the history of financial manias.

The index’s income statement turned in one of its best showings of recent years. Year-over-year sales growth for S&P 500 companies landed at 5.6%, exceeding the 5.0% rate in nominal GDP and mimicking the sales growth posted earlier in the year. 

It was 25 years ago this month when the legendary dot-com mania reached its crescendo, entering market lore as one of the greatest bubbles in history. This silver anniversary prompted us to create a month-long series of articles under the banner of “Manias, Bubbles, Panics, And Crashes.” Here we look back at the sheer scale and intensity of the internet craze.

Defined Outcome and Derivative Income ETFs each offer attractive features in the form of modified payout or income characteristics. However, these benefits come at a cost of limited upside, and a “buyer beware” approach should be taken to weighing their pros and cons. Sustained bull markets reveal the true impact of trading potential upside for considerable benefits in the here and now. This study attempts to quantify the opportunity costs of capped funds using 2023-24 as a particularly harsh test case.

Broad investor interest has validated the attractiveness of buffer and covered call funds. An important part of understanding these ETFs is having a solid grasp of the upside participation that is sold away. The last two years provided a perfect environment to empirically measure the give-up associated with selling calls.

The year 2024 will go down as one of the most hostile environments for active investors in the last 30 years. Style, size, and absolute market returns all have an impact on the relative performance of active versus passive portfolios; the fourth quarter continued a trend that has been in place for over two years.

This study provides an initial look at 2024 factor returns, paced by a 25% gain for the S&P 500 index. Three factors topped the S&P (one by just a smidgen) while eight fell short, a ratio we will later see is typical for exuberant bull markets. Of the laggards, six trailed the S&P by more than 10% with a seventh just sneaking inside that ignominious cut point, and their shortfalls contributed to an average factor spread of -6.3% for the eleven contenders.  We also find that 2024 was an echo of an even tougher 2023 when the S&Ps 26.3% return was also driven by mega-cap growth, causing nine factors to lag the index with an average shortfall of -9.0%. Two consecutive years with similarly spectacular yet narrow S&P returns led to significant underperformance across our basket of factors and motivated us to try to understand more about this phenomenon.

Our previous update reported that eight of ten factors outperformed the S&P 500, leading us to hope that maybe, just maybe, the market was broadening out from its narrow focus on mega-cap growth. Those hopes were dashed in the fourth quarter, as only two of ten factors managed to outperform the index.

The turning of the calendar is a time to reflect on the past year’s returns and analyze the relative performance of various asset classes. For 2024, no matter what equity theme is under the microscope, the yearly recap is bound to point to the very same explanation—Nvidia and mega-cap tech.

A Collateralized Loan Obligation is a special purpose vehicle designed to hold a portfolio of highly leveraged corporate loans in a structure that modifies the risk profile of the underlying loans.  A CLO funds its asset purchases by issuing securities backed by the loan portfolio.  These liabilities are layered in tranches defined by seniority and credit protection, ranging from AAA to B with a final equity buffer at the base of the capital structure.  CLOs have historically been the province of large asset managers, and it is only in recent years that smaller investors have been able to access CLOs simply and easily through an exchange traded fund.  Viewing CLO ETFs as a new option in our fixed income toolbox, we felt a deeper investigation was in order.

One of the benefits of exchange traded funds is the ability for investors to access complicated or non-traditional strategies in a simple easy-to-trade wrapper. We recently reviewed covered call funds and buffer funds, two option-based positions that are now available through ETFs. This month, we examine another multifaceted security that has recently become easier to obtain thanks to new ETF launches.

Revenues progressed for 75% of S&P 500 companies reporting, but only 60% of those realized gains in operating income. Pretax and net income continued to drop, such that headway in the bottom-line was positive for barely more than half of the firms.

Information Technology has led the market higher this year, gaining 37% to rank as the leader among all eleven sectors as of November 8th. However, there is a return anomaly within this sector that catches our attention. The S&P 500’s Semiconductor sub-industry has risen 96% while the Semiconductor Equipment sub-industry is up just 9%, miles behind the semiconductor group. The divergence seen in Chart 1 seems hard to fathom given the fundamentally interconnected nature of these two business models.

Despite outperformance of value and small-cap stocks, actively-managed value and small-cap portfolios both struggled. No style box managed a clear win in favor of active management, which is unusual for such leadership conditions. There are several explanations that can account for this behavior.

With the closely intertwined businesses of semiconductors and semiconductor equipment, it is not surprising that the two industries have historically performed similarly. Yet, in 2024, a colossal disconnect has emerged, with semi-equipment stocks up a paltry 5%, miles behind the booming semiconductors.

The relative performance of small caps lags the S&P 500 by 75% since 2018, and we wondered why.  Was the Magnificent 7 effect so exaggerated that Info Tech and Communication Services, the sectors at the epicenter of the mega-cap growth boom, created such an overwhelmingly high hurdle that small caps were not able to keep pace with these powerhouse companies?  Alternatively, has small cap weakness been the product of sluggish results across multiple sectors, irrespective of the mega-cap growth issue, such that large caps were superior no matter which direction you looked? We label these two hypotheses as “deep” (relating specifically to the narrow but intense Mag 7 effect in Info Tech and Comm Services) or “wide” (describing failings across most small cap companies and industries) and designed this study to identify the most likely explanation.

Factor returns flipped dramatically in the third quarter after posting widely divergent results in the first half of 2024. The opening six months of the year saw Momentum and Growth each gain more than 20%, while the combined factors’ overall median return was a measly +5%.

Small caps turned sour in August 2018, and since then, performance has been nothing less than disastrous. Is the enormous shortfall pervasive across small caps in general, or is it due to a top-heavy market with unusually huge returns from a few huge stocks? The answer may be helpful for those contemplating a contrarian position in this unloved corner of the market.

Traditionally defensive themes such as Staples and Utilities have outperformed over the summer months, reminding investors of the benefit of not going all-in on the AI growth theme. Quality is one of the most robust defensive factors, but even so has managed to outperform during the bull market run that began in October 2022.  While some Quality funds are designed to play defense, others seem more inclined to the offensive side of the field. We recommend that investors decide if they are targeting Quality specifically as a defensive exposure or as a core long-term holding to ensure they select the appropriate fund.